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This paper provides a case study for information sharing within a 
public/private not-for-profit partnership organization called 
ACTRA – Arizona Cyber Threat Response Alliance, Inc.. This 
initiative is comprised of public and private entities with 
government agencies as invited guests aligned around the goal of 
improved response to cyber security events. Technical, political, 
legal and organizational issues arise when multiple parties attempt 
to exchange information in a formal setting. Benefits and specific 
solutions developed are discussed. The study concludes with 
several areas for future improvement and investigation as well as 
recommendations for newly forming sharing groups. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Information and Data Sharing – 
access controls, information flow controls, authentication See 
also K.6.5. Intellectual Property, Government Privacy and Ethics. 
General Terms 
Security and Privacy 
Keywords 
TAXII, STIX, Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing, ISAO, ISAC 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The conceptual benefit of sharing cyber threat information is at 
the heart of the current anti-malware industry led by companies 
such as McAfee and Symantec. Information sharing among 
different organizations without that same central provider has 
been evolving in pockets with the FS-ISAC, formed in 1999, one 
of the earliest examples. The move from theoretical benefits to 
practical implementation of multi organization cyber threat 
information sharing remains a challenge. New Information 
Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO) constructs are being 
encouraged and partially funded by government initiatives under 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
Many organizations and participants today agree on why 
information sharing is important. In a recent report to Congress 
advantages described included greater agility and situational 
awareness as well as a “deeper understanding of threat actors’ 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)” [1]. If properly 
developed, shared information should lower the cost of defense 
and increase the ability to discover compromised systems.  A 
survey of IT professionals (not all of whom were in formal shared 
information networks) reported, however, that most of the threat 
information they received was not timely or specific enough 
(actionable) to meet their perceived need [2]. 
Cyber security professionals are today primarily embedded in the 
IT organization though it is now clear that the impact to a 
company or organization goes beyond the classic bounds of the 
technical computer domain. Product information, business 
strategies, sales and marketing contact information, and legal 
documents stored electronically are supported by IT but are 
fundamentally controlled and used by other organizations.  Access 
to these, their linkage with email accounts, web applications and 
documents stored on a variety of platforms including mobile 
devices and cloud systems stretches the ability of an IT 
department to protect the data [3]. 
Furthermore, in the first version of the National Institute for 
Standards and technology (NIST) cyber security framework, it is 
highlighted that access to threat information including TTP is 
critical to the development and maintenance of a robust cyber 
security plan and implementation within an organization [4]. 
One of the goals of ACTRA and similar ISAO’s is to break down 
the resistance to information sharing and engage not only the 
technical workers but also the business leadership.  The high level 
management teams are best equipped to see the overall scale of 
risk and reward beyond just the direct cost of spending on cyber 
security. The success of information sharing requires the 
development of metrics that can be gathered, monitored, analyzed, 
and then effectively communicated to achieve improvement as 
well as to continue justifying the expense of the practice [5]. 
A number of potential models for effective information sharing 
have been proposed. It is the community of interest that must 
implement and investigate the results of corporate and 
government information exchange where the vast bulk of critical 
assets sought by adversaries reside [6]. Cyber crime, increasingly 
the work of large networks of individuals, is best countered with a 
similarly organized structure [7]. 
2. ACTRA FORMATION 
ACTRA grew out of relationships developed with FBI’s 
InfraGard and the Arizona Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center 
(ACTIC).  When the Presidential directive 16363 was signed, it 
lent credibility to the concept of bringing private sector 
representatives to the table.  The organization is incorporated as a 
not for profit company with a board, a technical group of subject 
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy 
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, 
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
ACM CCS Conference’15, October 12-16, 2015, Denver, CO, USA. 
Copyright 2015 ACM 1-58113-000-0/00/0010 …$15.00. 
 
matter experts as well as an advisory board from private and 
public sector entities. This structure divides along lines of 
business, policy and technology with interchange as needed to 
create a functioning solution for the different requirements of the 
constituents. 
The ACTIC, formed in 2005, is a government sharing structure 
that was to address the challenges for timely exchange of 
intelligence and critical information among state, local and federal 
public safety agencies and ultimately provide a real-time 
information link with law enforcement and first responders [8].  
ACTRA built on experience gained through the efforts to bridge 
tribal, state, local and federal agencies, adding the dimensions of 
the private sector and support of academic interests. The 
foundation of the effort rests upon the desire to improve security 
without adding another layer of expense or process that would be 
a burden to members, resulting in a flat responsive structure that 
today operates in near real-time. 
This regional, cross industry information sharing group (ISAO) 
provides the opportunity to have in person meetings creating trust 
helping bridge organizational reluctance. ACTRA today has 
grown to include 14 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and is 
offering a multi-sector, regional and nationally scalable solution.  
3. CHALLENGES 
In late 2012 there were few examples of cross sector cyber threat 
information sharing models, most were ad hoc and primarily point 
to point informal sharing among colleagues.  Much of the success 
was hidden and below the approval radar of the organizations in 
which workers operated.  However this type of activity does not 
scale nor can it be funded to become institutional.  It may rely on 
single points of contact that could move to a different job position 
losing that valuable connection.  ACTRA on the other hand was 
designed to be visible at the C level organization to foster the 
needed support for the technology wizards that would ultimately 
have the challenge of implementation. 
3.1 Organizational Issues and Concerns 
Marketing and awareness was an initial hurdle and required 
communication via phone, email and at events in what seemed 
like a 24/7 campaign.  CSO and CEO alike were at first reluctant 
to enter into a new type of unproven relationship with potentially 
competitive organizations.  Worse perhaps, what does it mean to 
share information with the government?  In the past most people 
and companies seek to remain out of the range of government 
interaction.   
Corporate members could benefit from classified or sensitive data 
available from government agencies. Sharing with other 
corporations can likewise provide coverage that no single 
company no matter the size can hope to access.  Many companies 
are not practiced in the handling and dissemination of external 
data. What is the profit motive and accountability structure?  
Government entities enjoy certain protection from liability, 
however, they are at risk if classified data is shared in an 
irresponsible manner.  This can compromise on going 
enforcement or surveillance activities and be costly in terms of 
lost efforts and use of government funds. Individuals can also be 
harmed in their careers should problems arise within their 
jurisdiction. 
What is the role of academic members beyond the obvious special 
case of alignment as either a public institution or private entity? 
For researchers and students in the field of cyber intelligence and 
security, public policy and law, it is an excellent opportunity for 
study and experience. 
3.2 Legal and Financial Matters 
It was recognized from the outset that a template non-disclosure 
agreement (NDA) followed by a membership agreement was the 
best approach to meeting the legal requirements of the different 
organizations.  As reviews occurred the template rapidly matured 
and was able to be operational within 3 months. This put the 
Alliance, formed as a nonprofit corporation at the hub of the 
communications since the agreement is with the Alliance not with 
the peers.  This solved the potential nightmare of N2 agreements 
as the network grew.  
Key to the relationship was the agreement to protect the names of 
members in the organization unless they were willing to be 
associated in a public manner.  Some companies and 
organizations were concerned that they would become a greater 
target should they be identified as an active participant in 
information sharing. The actual threat versus perceived threat is 
still something to be measured. 
It was also discovered that different types of members would be 
required in order to gain the advantage of disparate players.  As 
will be further discussed in future work, this is an issue 
particularly for smaller organizations that may benefit from 
sharing yet can not participate fully for either technical or 
financial reasons. 
Would there be increased liability for a company if it received 
threat information that was not promptly utilized? This scenario is 
playing out in a recently settled court case with retail giant Target 
and its potential inaction in 2013 to vulnerabilities. The cost to a 
company in legal and financial fallout could be large. Faced with 
undefined risk, corporate members seek to limit their exposure 
with legal and policy choices that are being discussed in new 
legislative proposals. 
3.3 Technical Hurdles 
As security organizations scramble to keep up with the ever-
evolving threats, each organization develops its own methods and 
practices. Best practices differ by industry sector as well as by the 
size of the organization. Sophisticated and larger organizations 
with strong technical cyber security teams utilize network 
monitoring, intrusion detection and other management tools.  
These can integrate external threat data in manual or even 
automatic modes. The mechanism for translating threats into a 
standard format and framework has improved but is still in an 
early stage. The decision to utilize STIX and TAXII as the 
interface puts a burden on less able or resourced organizations 
[9]. There is additional potential risk in connecting networks even 
if the reason is for the sharing of sanitized indicators. This is 
mitigated by implementation of appropriate internal processes. 
4. SOLUTIONS AND BENEFITS 
ACTRA was able to build on developments and experiments from 
other sharing organizations such as the ISACs and government 
inter agency experiences thanks to the broad skill set of the 
different invested participants.  Even so, solutions necessarily 
have evolved and will continue to shift. As more organizations 
join, the tools and techniques will mature. 
It was recognized that information was valuable on different time 
scales.  The ideal state is for a threat or vulnerability to be 
discovered rapidly, characterized and communicated in a timely 
and actionable manner. As taken from Verizon’s 2013 study on 
data breaches shown in Table 1, this desire does not match well 
with the reality of cyber threats [10]. 
 
Table 1. Time scale disparity: compromise vs discovery; the 
fraction of breaches and the time to damage and discovery. 
Timescale Minutes Hours Days Weeks 
Damage 23% 60% 13% 3% 
Discovery 1% 9% 11% 78% 
 
Damage is done in seconds, minutes, and hours while discovery 
and containment are more often measured in days, weeks or even 
months. Of course it is possible that the early stages of 
reconnaissance and planning are also on a longer time scale.  
These activities are today not visible. This issue points to the 
leading edge of cyber security research – what tools and 
techniques can close this gap?  Is information sharing in the form 
of a larger but more loosely coupled information gathering honey 
net coupled with intelligent mining and pattern analysis able to 
shift the advantage?  
4.1 Situational Awareness – White Papers 
At the policy and educational level, ACTRA has been successful 
in raising awareness in the highest levels of organizations.  These 
products provide insights, best practices, and tips for improving 
awareness among the users within an organization.  One example 
is a debrief on some of the valuable learning from the recent 
incident where a corporation such as SONY was targeted by a 
nation state level threat actor with intent to damage not just gain 
financially or exfiltrate intellectual property.  The papers are 
appropriate to the slower time scale and meant to be consumed via 
email. Their impact is on policies and procedures, offering a 
reminder to practice and keep frameworks alive and changing.   
Based upon comparisons within ACTRA, teams that have a clear 
response plan and procedures, and most importantly practice 
disaster scenarios, are better able to handle actual situations. 
Sharing of these best practices, backup and recovery techniques 
and example plans has been rated very useful.  
Companies are also re-packaging threat information and white 
papers, providing a version as educational outreach to include the 
“end user” in the cyber security defense plan. Data inputs for 
enriching threats intelligence is also available through outreach 
via “crowd sourcing”. This changes it from some abstract item to 
a current and actual example. 
4.2 News and Blog Site 
ACTRA has developed an invitation only site to allow members 
to access information on their schedule rather than push via email. 
A user can then request notification when a new entry of interest 
is posted.  Information is categorized based on the survey 
responses for types relevant to the member.  The site has an 
editorial board and a process for creating articles, alerts, and 
intelligence briefs.  Members can also contribute posts or 
comments.  This is successfully utilizing university students to 
seek relevant material via open source (OSINT) methods, which 
provides an excellent experience for the students and a cost 
effective resource to the Alliance. 
4.3 Alerts 
More actionable and timely are the official use only alerts 
including FOUO information with specific data from on-going 
investigations, analysis or active events.  Though these may still 
be old compared to the actual initial breach, it is early in the 
analysis lifecycle so not all attribution or analysis is available.  
Examples include potential IP addresses, web addresses, code 
samples, and hash signatures associated with a specific known 
event.  This can be utilized by an IT organization to update 
firewall or intrusion detection systems (IDS) rules, compare with 
logs from their own organization network feeds and potentially 
create additional data from their early alert. ACTRA disseminates 
these in both classified and un-classified settings through its 
vetted and pre-trusted relations.  
This is one of the more sensitive types of communication as it 
represents information that, if leaked, could alert the attacker of 
the ability to identify possibly causing them to go underground, 
change their TTP or accelerate plans with any existing campaign. 
ACTRA has created limited distribution lists and the efforts are 
rated as beneficial by recipients.  They would like to see more 
timely and actionable alerts and this is an area of future growth. 
Separate classified briefings were held with invitation only and 
pre-registered list used to validate attendees.  This met the 
security needs of the public agencies as well as provided greater 
access to intelligence to the private sector participants. 
4.4 Automated Data 
The most exciting development is the acquisition and 
dissemination of threat data that is closer to real time based on 
information gathered from IDS, security information and event 
management (SIEM) solutions and investigations.  The goal of 
this work is to achieve a machine to machine connection that can 
be used along with other threat intelligence data in the security 
operations center of member organizations. The groups have 
agreed to utilize the NIST/MITRE standard STIX/TAXII.  
Vendors are supporting the import of data and discussions are 
beginning to consider creating an international standard. The 
Alliance members’ implementation is still in the early stages. 
Those participating indicate a strong interest in continuing and 
rate the value of the effort as high.   
The most successful operational efforts occur from member 
contributions which can include zero day events.  In the past 
month automated feeds have come on-line with 30,000+ events all 
available to members 
4.5 Survey on Benefits 
In the early stage of ACTRA formation, a survey was developed 
to understand what kinds of information would be valuable, who 
the expected audience was and how the data should be delivered. 
This helped to develop the products and organize the Alliance. 
The results were consistent with larger surveys [11] and the 
survey included some questions to allow correlation. One of the 
results found was that top leadership, including the board, is 
generally uninvolved.  This was important in the decision to target 
the C-level and board level of member organizations with 
appropriate materials. 
The area of greatest interest by the survey respondents was 
support or intelligence on advanced persistent threats (APT).  This 
has been a focus for the think tank group within the Alliance and 
remains an area of future growth. New tools and incident 
management systems appear promising and more are supporting 
the chosen exchange formats. 
A new follow up survey to assess how the Alliance has performed 
in meeting the expectations of its members has begun. The full 
results of that new survey, though not available yet, will help 
guide new investments over the next year. Early indications point 
to continued technical and monetary investment in ACTRA, a 
desire to connect with other organizations and enhancement of the 
real time components. 
5. FUTURE EFFORTS 
Continued operations and enhancement of the present set of 
offerings point to a change in the all-volunteer model. The ability 
to deliver products in a timely and predictable manner with loose 
accountability is problematic. An aspect of this was apparent in 
the predominance of larger corporations among the members. 
Smaller organizations cannot spare their already limited resources 
on a regular basis. The organization is looking at a variety of 
different models as well as seeking other sources for funding to 
create a core team. 
As seen in recent security breaches and reported in surveys, 
smaller companies in the supply chain have been targeted as 
means to access ultimate higher value assets. It is critical to 
include smaller members of the supply chain in future initiatives 
and this has begun with educational efforts in cooperation with 
the Arizona Tech Council. This will build the critical trust factor 
without compromising the security of present members.  
The success of using students to provide OSINT capabilities, 
create reports, develop material for and manage blog sites and 
newsletters will be continued.  An initiative to provide internship 
and co-op opportunities will allow a more reliable access to this 
resource particularly in the summer months. Funding from grant 
programs and the awareness of the workforce growth opportunity 
for companies will assist this development. 
An area of research includes adding multiple authentication levels 
in automated data to help reduce false positives.  Another topic to 
be explored is the identification of “critical” indicators.   
Experience with member companies and academic researchers has 
earned trust and it is planned to make more data available for 
testing newly developed algorithms and concepts. An area of 
interest is creating weight methods to validate threat indicators 
derived from different sources. This is relevant when the sources 
have different methods, practices and standards for inclusion in 
the set. 
This points to a variety of desired improvements in the data 
sharing platform as companies and vendors learn better the 
methods and automation to transform internal threat data into a 
sanitized exchange format. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
With over two years as an organization, ACTRA continues to 
grow in membership and scope of its offerings.  Even though 
some participants expressed their disappointment that progress 
was not more rapid given the time investment, this case study 
clearly indicated the importance and necessity of the systematic 
procedures and framework that can facilitate threat information 
sharing. Information sharing, like the popular social networking 
activity, is a group activity and requires active and frequent 
involvement for proactively coping with security threats and 
exploits in a timely manner.  
Recommendations: Other ISAO’s could benefit from the 
experiences gained over the course of ACTRA early stages:  1) 
Establish expectations and set realistic goals with at least semi-
annual review of progress;  2) Allow for changes in the plan, 
admitting when adjustments are required; 3) Create an atmosphere 
of transparency and inclusion. 4) Develop a core team and 
leadership that is willing and able to meet regularly and often;  5) 
Establish alternate representatives to maintain continuity; and 6) 
Create a communication method for decisions, issues and 
suggested solutions. 
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